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Cognitive-behavioral theory and therapy, and Postmodernism
Recent developments in cognitive-behavioral theory and cognitive-behavioral approaches to
psychotherapy illustrate some of the implications of postmodernism for psychology, and
especially for clinical practice. Here we will briefly consider some of these developments in
cognitive-behavioral theory and therapy respectively, and briefly address some implications for
integration.
Cognitive-Behavioral theory. Because of their development in the 70’s and 80’s, many
of cognitive-behavioral approaches are strongly influenced by postmodernist thought. Cognitive
therapy models may be loosely divided into two or three groups. A three group model divides
the approaches into coping skill, problem solving, and cognitive-structuralist models. In the two
group structure there are the cognitive-associationistic models (which combine coping skills and
problem solving models into a single group), and the cognitive-strucuralist and constructivist
models. Among the latter are the approaches of Guidano and Liotti (Guidano & Liotti, 1983;
Guidano, 1988) and Mahoney (Mahoney, 1974, 1980, 1988, 1991; Niemeyer & Mahoney, 1995).
Table XX provides an overview of several of the major cognitive-behavioral models (adapted
from Dobson, 1988).
Ellis’ REBT was developed in the 1960’s. The remaining C-B therapy models developed
in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Initially these models were developed by academic research clinicians
to treat very specific populations with narrowly defined problems. Outcomes were focused on
reduction in symptomatic manifestations of these problems. It is these interventions and
outcomes that are the core of the psychotherapy “efficacy” research. Gradually the techniques
and models have been extended to other problems and populations and integrated into what are
now known as “integrative models” of psychotherapy. Most of these developments are deeply
rooted in modernist scientific-rationalist traditions.
Because the coping skills and problem solving approaches are largely rooted in a
modernist worldview, we will not examine them here. In some ways Ellis’ REBT is an anomaly.
It was initially developed in the 1960’s before the coping skills and problem solving approaches,
yet has more kinship with the constructivist models, both in its emphasis on the cognition-affect
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nexus rather than the cognition-behavior nexus, and in its tendency toward rationalism or
mentalism. Here we will focus on the cognitive structuralist model of Guidano and Liotti (1983)
and the recent writings of Mahoney (1980; 1982, 1988; Niemeyer & Mahoney, 1995) and Dowd
and Pace (1989).
Guidano and Liotti proposed a deep-structure meta-theory that “emphasizes the active,
generative, and intentional dimensions of personal knowing processes . . . aimed at . . .
identifying invariant deep structures” (p. 307). For them, “therapy is therefore based upon the
elaboration of alternative models of the self and the world such that the deep structures can adopt
a more flexible and adaptive articulation” (p. 307). While we cannot do justice to their model
here, several points will be helpful. Their model of human knowing includes several features:
1. Evolutionary epistemology
2. Self-organizing: autopoiesis (self-renewal/self-organizing); human knowing system
functions are centered around maintenance and renewal of their own organization they possess
individuality and uniqueness. [open system]
3. Motor theory of mind: mind is active, producing both output and much of its own
input (contrasted with notion of mind as passive receiver of incoming sensation); unconscious
tacit processes are given a central role as supra-conscious events “the mind is . . . a system of
abstraction rules capable of bringing about a relational order of events in order to produce
experience and behavior” (p. 310).
4. Deep or tacit levels of knowing constrain and direct surface cognitive structures;
cognitive change occurs without loss of organization (or identity)
For Guidano and Liotti, the organization of development has several key features. First,
“human knowledge is imbued with and biased by all the invariant aspects (evolutionary and
cultural constraints) that define human nature” (p. 311) and determine human knowing [compare
with imago dei]; thus identity (being) and knowing are intertwined. Second, attachment is
viewed as a central organizing principle in cognitive development; because cognitive abilities
develop more slowly, emotional schemata direct the unfolding perceptual-cognitive processes
and “influence the content that self-knowledge can assume” (p. 313). A set of abstract rules for

Postmodernism - 4
interaction which operate mainly tacitly and automatically govern the integrated operation of
(thoughts, feelings and behavior).

Explicit and conscious appraisal of self emerges only later.

Third, developmental stages are viewed as a progression of steps in self-knowledge organization.
Dowd and Pace (1989) proposed that constructivist theory assumes that knowledge flows
from the inside out, and that the mind is both active and constructive. “Constructivist
metatheory (holds) . . . one common assumption: that reality is not invariant but is created by
each individual according to his or her self-schemata and tacit rules governing the creation and
organization of knowledge” (p. 217; emphasis added).
Mahoney (1988) proposed that the cognitive revolution seems to parallel the leading edge
of technological development. According to Mahoney, much of the controversy in these new
developments revolves around traditional views of realism and rationalism.. He contends that
critical assumptions about

ontology (the nature of reality),

epistemology (a theory of

knowing), and causality (theories of causation) are central to issues in recent cognitive therapies.
“Realism presumes a singular, stable, external reality that is accurately revealed by one’s senses.
Rationalism presumes that thought is superior to sense and most powerful in determining
experience” (p. 363). It emphasizes thought and mind, over experience, body, and world.
“Constructivism asserts that humans actively create and construe their personal and social
realities. . . proponents . . . question whether reality is fundamentally external and stable, and
whether human thought is meaningfully separable from human feeling and action” (p. 364,
italics original).
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy. Constructivist models of cognitive-behavioral therapy
emphasize the nexus between thought and emotion; broadly we could describe this as the
experiential nexus. Dowd and Pace (1989) distinguished first order change and second order
change. They proposed that first order change involved attacking the problem. In their view,
first order change works “within a system that itself remains unchanged following unchanging
rules of operation” (p. 219); its usual focus is on “applying the opposite of the problem
behavior” (p. 219); in the face of failure, it “does more of the same” and/or blames the
patient/client (p. 219). The problem with first order change, they proposed, is that basic
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assumptions about therapeutic model and client reality construction are never questioned, and
may not even be known or accessible to articulation. Change may fail; or one person in system
may improve and another deteriorate. They contend that trying harder actually exacerbates some
problems, e.g., sleeplessness and anxiety.
Dowd and Pace proposed second order change, or attacking the solution. Here one
chooses to focus on the solution rather than the (original) problem. This decontextualizing
changes the frame of reference and the meaning of the symptom; the resulting disequilibrium
prompts the person to develop an alternative belief system (accommodation) which may be more
viable. The more disequilibration, the greater the resistance and the more intense the emotions
which will occur. This model undercuts linear causal notions, opening up the possibility of
multiple causality. Second-order change strategies help the person consider her/his role in the
problem; it exposes the relativity of reality, opening the person to considering alternative
constructions of reality. These implicit and indirect challenges result in reconsidering, and
changing, implicit knowledge structures. Because the therapist is not obviously responsible,
internal attributions occur, solidifying therapeutic change.
Beutler (1983) proposed that reactance (or resistance) is related to an internal locus of
control. Paradoxically, successful therapy increases internal locus of control, hence reactance,
making people subsequently more resistant to change! According to Beutler, defiance-based or
paradoxical strategies appear more effective with high reactance (internal LOC) clients, while
compliance-based strategies are more effective with low reactance (external LOC) clients
(Beutler, 1979).
According to this model, the genius of second-order change techniques is that “by
modifying the attempts at change and violating the usual rules governing change-producing
efforts, it forces the individual to redefine the nature of reality and provides an implicit message
that reality is indeed relative” (Dowd & Pace, 1989; p. 224). This forces evolutionary
development of knowledge structures, and shifts in meaning which will alter behaviors and
emotions. Several second-order change strategies were proposed by Dowd and Pace. These
include:
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Reframing - best for relatively compliant clients, it involves shifting meaning of problem
or event by pointing out opposite values (e.g., benefits of awareness of one’s pain)
Symptom prescription - practicing problem behavior generally (e.g., for insomnia, see if
you can stay awake all night), or at a specific time or place (e.g., see if you can have a panic
attack in the waiting room).
Restraining - discouraging the client from changing at all or for a specific time period
(e.g., in sex therapy seeking agreement to not attempt intercourse for the next two weeks), or
exploring negative consequences of change and the benefits of her/his present situation
Positioning - agreeing with, rather than challenging, negative self-statements (parallel to
judo), thus “breaking the rules” (or extinguishing?) so that reactance is therapeutic (e.g., rather
than dispute person’s claim to be a “loser” therapist affirms it)
Integrative Reflections on Constructivist CBT. Constructivist models raise a number of
issues of interest from a Christian perspective. These have to do with the nature of reality, how it
works, how it is known, ethics, and human personhood. Several of these will be addressed by
Dr. Buhrow. Here I will address those most pertinent to cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy.
First, a constructivist model lends itself to mentalistic reductionism. While the question
of the nature of reality (ontology) remains, the model is biased toward skepticism or outright
rejection of the notion of a real external world (realism). Hermeneutics is an alternative to
constructivism in explaining many of the same phenomena; people who perceive the same events
often interpret them differently. Second, most of the interventions proposed by constructivists
are at least partially compatible with alternative theoretical models. Third, because these
theories are relatively new, limited amounts of empirical evidence have yet been amassed
regarding many of the central questions raised. Among these are questions about the efficacy of
treatment following these models. The constructivist models tend to naturally align with
worldviews which reject notions of a real world, scientific rationalism, objective knowing, and
universal ethics; they join with those views which accept emphasis on relationship and
spirituality, but generally limit them to experiential status (versus ontological reality).
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On the positive side, postmodernism and constructivism alert us to the reality that all
facts are interpreted, and thus inevitably tainted by personal biases. They draw attention to the
significance of the personal-subjective frame of reference, the importance of community and
relationship (though these are in tension with some basic principles of constructivism), and
affirm spiritual awareness.
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Table XX
Overview of Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches

Approach/Author

Year

Title

Ellis

1962

Rational-Emotive Therapy

Beck

1963

Cognitive Therapy

Meichenbaum

1971

Self-Instructional Training

Maultsby

1975

Rational Behavior Therapy

Guidano & Liotti

1983

Structural Therapy

Suinn & Richardson

1971

Anxiety-Management Training

Meichenbaum

1973

Stress Inoculation Training

Goldfried

1974

Systematic Rational Restructuring

D’Zurilla & Goldfried

1971

Problem-Solving Therapy

Spivack & Shure

1971

Problem-Solving Therapy

Mahoney

1974

Personal Science

Rehm

1977

Self-Control Therapy

Cognitive Restructuring

Coping Skills

Problem Solving

Note: adapted from Dobson (1988), p. 12

Postmodernism - 12

Cognition
.

Constructivist

Problem-solving
Coping Skill

----------------------------------------------------------Affect
Behavior

Figure 1: Relationship of cognitive behavioral models to domains of behavior which are
emphasized.

